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The sheer military/industrialcapacity of this nation shamesany historical comparison. For astretch of forty years, America
allocated trillions of dollars to confront
the Soviet threat, building five complete
branches of the military, as well as their
supporting research and industrial bases.
Today, the "military-industrial complex"
stands as the largest agglomeration of
capital and industrial labor resources in
America. It saps 15 percent of America's
scientific brain power, employs three
million people, and funds 32,000 prime
contractors and 100,000 subordinated
facilities. One million civilians and 1.9
million in uniform work under the
Pentagon(Melman 11). Nevertheless, the
bipolar world and concomitant arms race
has dissolved. The Cold War is a tepid
artifact and defense expenditures on a
Herculean scale can no longer be justi-
fied. These days politicians, columnists,
and economists are buzzing about a
"once-in-a-lifetime" peace dividend.
They argue for a comprehensive conver-
sion of the national military-industrial
base, where the resources exploited for
defense purposes are redirected toward
civilian ambitions.
So goes the popular concept of
defense conversion or whatever you call
it (diversification, economic adjustment,
military transition, defense reinvest-
ment...). The central tenet of conversion
asserts that companies which produce
goods for the defense market can be
guided, with a little effort, toward a suc-
cessful civilian market. The benefits to
the country could be immense. Labor
and machinery reserved for defense
could be retrained and retooled for civil-
ian use. Rebuilding the infrastructure,
developing civilian technologies, and
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shoring-up the nation's economic com-
petitive edge are all plausible options.
However, those grandiose
designs of a new civilian economy are
not the reasons why conversion is a
favorite in Washington. The real motive
for conversion is jobs. Defense cutbacks
will have a crippling effect on private
industry. Everyone knows that the
Department of Defense(DoD) is a
tremendous stimulant to the economy.
Along with the Pentagon, it practices a
de facto industrial policy, subsidizing
key technologies and investing in basic
and applied research and development
(R & D). This high-tech research is spun-
off, giving the products of civilian firms a
competitive boost over foreign products.
But as defense funds begin to taper off,
bases will close, military personnel dis-
missed, and defense contractors starved
for income, triggering a new wave of
unemployment. Worse, defense down-
sizing generates a ripple-effect—three
subcontracting jobs are lost for every one
prime contracting job(Elli
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live." What does this approach acknowl-
edge? First, civilian technologies are
advancing faster than the military's.
Secondly, sustaining a world-class indus-
trial base starts with a sizable investment
in R & D, and thirdly, US non-defense R
& D, as a percentage of national product,
lags substantially behind that of Japan's
or Germany's.
Clinton's conversion plan now
operates within the context of these three
realities. Billions of dollars will be shift-
ed from defense to civilian R & D. The
government will also endeavor to fuse
the defense manufacturing establishment
and its commercial counterpart to pro-
The Cold War is a tepid
artifact and defense
expenditures on a
Herculean scale can no
longer be justified.
duce dual-use technologies, products
that have both defense and non-defense
applications. More investments via the
Advance Research Projects Agency
(ARPA) will be made in information and
process technologies, advanced materi-
als, and microelectronics. ARPA—
America's answer to Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry—will
cultivate a government/industry part-
nership and aggressively push dual-use
and defense conversion initiatives to
dampen the shock when the DoD's con-
tractors switch to commerical-oriented
goods and services.
The idea is credible—aiding the
conversion of defense firms, fostering
technologies and incorporating them into
commercial products. If conversion is.
successful, when the downsizing is com-
plete, jobs will be saved, communities
will rebound, and American business
will be lean and mean.
But will defense conversion
work? Past performance would indicate
"no." The economy naturally contracted
and entered a prolonged slump after
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Each
time the military cuts came, defense con-
tractors, even the biggest and most
respected, attempted to diversify in com-
mercial markets. Boeing and Grumman
tried their hand in the urban-transporta-
tion market by building electric trains
and buses—a flaming catastrophe. The
maker of the F-15, McDonnell Douglas,
went on a short and (disastrous)
escapade into the civilian sector by man-
ufacturing medical systems and micro-
electronics controls. General Dynamics
was eaten alive by commercial firms
when it dived into telecommunications
(Lundquist). The truth is, most defense
contractors have a woeful record when it
comes to conversion.
Indeed, the euphoria over con-
verting legions a defense firms is short-
lived. There is a realistic, sobering side
to the defense transition, and it is imper-
ative that federal policies reflect that. In
confronting the economic validity of con-
version, we need to avow the gaping cul-
tural dichotomy between the commercial
and defense sectors. It's a whole, new
ball game.
Successful conversion will be
difficult because of two factors: govern-
ment procurement practices and the
business culture of the commercial mar-
ket.
Simply put, the DoD procures
products differently from their contrac-
tors than we civilians do from ours.
These acquisition standards along with
regulatory barriers result in a type of
product that only has utility in a defense
market and cannot be directly applied in
commercial fields or easily utilized by
commercial consumers.
Military buyers tell defense con-
tractors what they need and how it is to
be manufactured with exacting stan-
dards. Furthermore, these specifications
are frequently inordinate relative to com-
mercial standards. For example, military
equipment must operate in severe (how-
ever unrealistic) environmental condi-
tions, such as in a thermonuclear explo-
sion. Pushing such standards involves a
bureaucratic army of acquisition person-
nel and volumes of procurement laws
and regulations. These standards, cost-
accounting problems, and incessant
acquisition reviews are also the key bar-
riers to developing dual-use technolo-
gies. Moreover, defense procurement
emphasizes optimum performance at
whatever expense. So the Pentagon will
dole out exclusive contractors and cost-
overrun guarantees in search of state-of-
the-art technology, even if there is the
smallest incremental rise in perfor-
mance(Leopold 4).
Ironically, the same factors that
produce success in the defense industry,
engender failure in the commercial sec-
tor. What we get are fat, inflexible com-
panies that are shielded from market
place operations and cutthroat competi-
tion. We get a different corporate strate-
gy, one that de-emphasizes cost-efficien-
cy, quantity-quality trade-offs, and mar-
ket adaptability. The overhead onus and
inefficient processes that are the legacy of
present procurement practices make
entry into the commercial market precar-
ious.
And what of this market? It is a
market obeying different rules and oper-
ating under a different culture. The envi-
ronment is proactive, not reactive. The
consumer doesn't give the firm a recipe
to follow, the firm makes up the recipe
and lets the consumer pick the cheapest
one. Commercial companies are entre-
preneurial, excessively competitive, and
prefer to manufacture not the most
advanced product, but the most cost-
effective. Although technology is impor-
tant, distribution channels and just plain
business savvy will be the decisive fac-
tors.
A good reason for why convert-
ing is so hard, is that defense companies
are ignorant of how the commercial mar-
ketplace functions. They are sorely lack-
ing of such rudimentary business skills
as marketing, strategic planning, market
research, and management and product
development. They need marketing
staffs and sales staffs, their accounting
systems need to be overhauled
(Lundquist). In short, they have no idea
what they are getting into.
If conversion is success-
ful, when the downsizing
is complete, jobs will be
saved, communities will
rebound, and American
business will be lean and
mean.
One vital fact should not be
overlooked: most markets are already
filled. Today's defense industry, and
hence its products, is becoming increas-
ingly divergent from the commercial
industry. For instance, what civilian
needs stealth technology? Even if a con-
vertible technology such as night-vision
optics does find a way into the market,
consumer demand will be trivial in con-
trast with the DoD's former needs.
Many contractors will decide conversion
is simply not worth it. It is better to tai-
lor to one, predictable five-sided cus-
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tomer than millions of civilians that are
more volatile and less distinct.
Thus, beating swords into prof-
itable plowshares is at best problematic.
And therefore the question which
ineluctably follows is: "Is a sweeping
conversion initiative in the country's best
interest?"
The Bush Administration
argued that it was not. Granted, defense
downsizing would close factories and
Whatever the government
does to intervene, con-
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bases, and the economic impact would
be severe, even crippling, to some areas,
but the pain would be localized and not
likely to be widespread. After all, the
defense industry now comprises a small-
er share or the national economy, a $6
trillion economy that can readily absorb
$50 billion in defense cutbacks.
We also should not forget that
the US financed the military/industrial
complex on borrowed money. With
deficits so titanic, it makes sense to use
the peace dividend to pay our dues, not
waste it on government conversion pro-
grams.
And why is it that there exists
programs that give special treatment to
defense workers while none existed for
others when their industries faltered?
Defense conversion smacks of industrial
policy. The whole idea of playing
favorites is unfair and many times ineffi-
cient, for the government is inept at pick-
ing winning technologies and has a
propensity to prop up decaying indus-
tries. The party is over. Defense firms
and their employees got rich from the
government, so why should the govern-
ment throw in more tax money and
intervene as they restructure and relo-
cate? Let market forces, however ruth-
less, run their course, and ultimately the
right resources will be shifted to the most
sensible areas.
Of course, we need to be realis-
tic. Although Americans cringe at the
thought of more government, they refuse
to follow a strict laissez-faire prescrip-
tion, especially when jobs at home are at
stake. And with a liberal ideological
slant, the Democratic Administration
will be too accommodating. SHU, history
makes abundantly clear that an unfet-
tered market system will outperform any
socialist agenda.
So which brand of economics
should out country's policies reflect?
More specifically, what should be the
government's role during the defense
transition, and what would private-sec-
tor contractors do to help themselves?
These questions will define the
conversion debate, but before they are
answered, we need to list the objectives
of our conversion/economic adjustment
policies: To keep people and communi-
ties working, to improve the global com-
petitiveness of US industry, and to pre-
serve the most essential elements of the
defense industrial base.
Achieving all three objectives
would imply a successful conversion
effort. Unfortunately, the doctrine of
laissez-faire accepts the inevitability of
major job loss and iron-handed industrial
contraction when supply and demand
forces strive for equilibrium. Thus, each
goal would be severely jeopardized, bar-
ring any government "meddling."
This warrants at least a limited
form of government intervention. To
begin, it makes sense for the government
to cultivate an economic climate favor-
able for conversion and military-com-
mercial integration. Federal policy could
extend targeted incentives to the defense
industry to pursue new markets and pro-
vide civilian R & D tax credits. But by
far, the best approach is simply to ensure
a growing, robust economy, where new
markets and opportunities can emerge
for the defense firms.
Military-commercial integration
and dual-use technologies offer an
unprecedented chance to promote long-
term economic growth and unrivaled US
competitiveness. Merging with civilian
technologies, which are becoming more
advanced and less expensive then mili-
tary counterparts, would maintain the
viability of the defense industrial base
and make it more cost-effective.
Therefore, it is imperative that the DoD
encourage the flow of technologies,
products, and processes
commercial and defense
revamp or rescind procureirt
regulations that obstruct thl
This includes streamlining aij
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Consolidation, restructuring to
stay in or get of the defense business,
involves reducing employment and cut-
ting R & D and capital expenditures.
Diversification occurs through conver-
sion or acquisition of other business divi-
sions. Both are the dominant strategies.
Selling products overseas or to other
government agencies such as NASA, the
Federal Aviation Administration, and the
Drug Enforcement Administration offers
some respite from the defense build-
down but revenues are meager com-
pared to the DoD's former contracts.
The US defense industry is a
heterogeneous amalgam of different
sized contractors manufacturing differ-
ent products. Due to flexibility, small
defense companies generally convert bet-
ter than big, ones, yet they lack the
resources to exploit new-found opportu-
nities. The larger contractors will set
modest goals for diversification. But for
the rest, the best option may be to ride
out the transition and stay in the lucra-
tive defense business, despite reduced
profits and layoffs.
Whatever the government does
to intervene, contractors must concede
the imminent and painful process of
shrinking, restructuring, and shedding
thousands of jobs. There is no escape, for
the fate of the defense industry is ulti-
mately for market forces to decide. Yet,
there is opportunity for a judicious gov-
ernment role in the transition by provid-
ing short-term assistance and promoting
long-term economic growth.
The aforementioned policies of
preserving key elements in the defense
industrial base mandate some form of
direct government intervention. These
policies are not to be applied to defense
contractors when national security is not
directly at stake—which is most of the
time.
So what is needed is concerned
but detached government, a government
which merely ensures an economic cli-
mate favorable for conversion, but does
not actually manage a firm's conversion
itself. It is wrong and unfair for legisla-
tors to turn the peace dividend into a
jobs program. Outright grants or direct
subsidies that rescue firms and back con-
version ventures is wasteful. Conversion
policy should remove barriers to allow
companies to help themselves. For
example, Congress should rescind
antitrust laws that prevent companies
from merging to survive. Government
can encourage firms through incentives
to explore integration and dual-used,
and it can identify, not "pick" and devel-
op, key technologies. A new emphasis
on civilian R & D is not a bad idea too.
Clinton's sweeping conversion
initiative has merit, but it must be based
on the rational assessment that conver-
sion offers limited success. It simply is
not feasible for Lockheed to manufacture
basketballs and soft-drinks. But clearly,
government action can help. Funding
programs that assist dislocated workers
and aid communities disproportionately
hurt is tantamount to disaster relief and
should be done. Policies that help
defense firms acquire the flexibility to
survive the transition also make sense.
Great military powers tend to
spend excessively on armaments.
However, this diverts resources from
other sectors of the national economy,
and results in the general decline of a
nation's commercial competitive advan-
tage. It would be tragic if the US did not
seize the opportunity to reverse this
trend. But it would be equally tragic if
we wasted the spoils of victory on ill-
conceived and misguided conversion
efforts. •
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